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This article examines how closely nanotechnology resembles a general purpose technology
(GPT). Using patented nanotechnology inventions during 1975-2006, we test for characteristics
of GPTs identiﬁed in the prior literature, and ﬁnd evidence that nanotechnology shows both
“pervasive” adoption and “spawning” of follow-on innovation. Offering a methodological contri-
bution, we employ concentration indexes such as the Gini index and Lorenz curve to construct
“knowledge dissemination curves” for different technologies, thereby providing evidence that
nanotechnology shares relevant characteristics with other GPTs. Using an entirely new dataset,
we use three different deﬁnitions of a “nanotechnology patent” and calculate patent generality
indexes, ﬁnding that nanotechnology patents are signiﬁcantly more likely to be referenced across
technology space than are patents in information technology, another widely-adopted GPT. In
another contribution, we suggest that innovative materials may demonstrate the characteristics of
a GPT, and provide a historical parallel between the advancement of steel technology in the 19th
Century with that of nanotechnology in the present day.*
I. Introduction
While modern economies are driven by knowledge expansion and innovation, there is disagree-
ment on how to characterize the process of technological change. On one hand, a signiﬁcant
part of the endogenous growth literature describes the process of innovation as a sequence of
incremental changes that either improve the quality of inputs or expand the menu of technolo-
gies (see BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN [2004] for a review). But in the mid 1990s a group of
scholars, alert to the contribution of economic historians, began a systematic effort to give an
alternative formal representation to technical progress (see HELPMAN [1998]). Their approach
conceptualized the process as non-linear, in contrast to the linear one hypothesized in the earlier
endogenous growth literature.
The non-linear model cycle developed by these scholars starts with a major breakthrough
technology which opens up new opportunities to develop incremental innovation which, in turn,
facilitates the use of the radical innovation ex post. This model of innovation implies a different
view of the long-run dynamics of an economy, in which phases of development are organized
along the introduction and the diffusion of radical “game changing” innovations, such as the
steam or the combustion engine, electricity and the dynamo, and information technologies and
the computer. BRESNAHAN and TRAJTENBERG [1992; 1995] introduced the term “general
purpose technology” (GPT) to describe the innovation at the center of technological change,
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suggesting that such innovations would be a driver of economic dynamism in modern economies.
In contrast to the endogenous growth literature, the newer GPT literature builds on the insights
of ROSENBERG [1963] and other economic historians who suggested that, to adequately
understand the process of technology development, one must consider both the rate and direction
of technical change.
In this article, we investigate how closely “nanotechnologies” share some identiﬁable
characteristics with past GPTs. Understanding the main features of an emerging GPT is relevant
for making predictions about its effects on the dynamics of the economy, and for informing
government policies on how best to allocate public resources to facilitate the development and
rapid diffusion of new technology. BRESNAHAN and TRAJTENBERG [1995] have theoretically
demonstrated that if innovation is driven by GPTs, then in a decentralized economy ﬁrms
under-invest in the development and adoption of such new technologies. Predicting the key
technologies in which to invest is a growing concern of countries that are trying to “catch up”
with nations performing closer to the world’s constantly-moving technological frontier. As an
example, Taiwan and Malaysia have made large investments to attract foreign ﬁrms to perform
R&D locally, intending that science and technology will spill over into other sectors of their
economies (see BUNNELL [2003]; LIU and CHEN [2003]).
We will conduct our analysis of the emergence of a GPT by examining patent data, including
citations made to other patents. The data we use originate primarily in the US Patent and
Trade Ofﬁce (USPTO), although we also use some data from the European Patent Ofﬁce
(EPO). In completing our analysis, we rely upon three aspects of a GPT emphasized in the
literature: technological dynamism (the characteristic that the technology should improve over
time), pervasiveness (that it should be adopted in many sectors), and its propensity to spawn
other innovations (that it should accelerate the invention of follow-on processes, products, or
materials). Our investigation will focus mainly on these last two aspects because these are the
primary source of positive externalities.1
As a methodological contribution, we employ a novel method to evaluate the feature of
innovation spawning using patent citation data. In the existing literature exploiting patent data,
a high value in a patent’s generality index has been read to imply both greater pervasiveness
and a higher likelihood to spawn follow-on innovations in other sectors. Our article for the ﬁrst
time we are aware separates these two aspects of a GPT and empirically tests for innovation
spawning by analyzing the distribution of “knowledge spillovers” across patent classes. We also
add to a growing literature that tests the GPT characteristics of different technologies using
patent data (FELDMAN and YOON [2012]; HALL and TRAJTENBERG [2004]; MOSER and
NICHOLAS [2004]) by examining nanotechnology and comparing this new technology with
GPT candidates identiﬁed in previous studies.
This article continues our earlier work (YOUTIE, IACOPETTA, and GRAHAM [2008])
testing with patent data whether nanotechnology is a GPT.2 In that previous study, we concluded
1. As pointed out by LUCAS [2002], externalities are likely to be a key aspect of any explanation of modern develop-
ment. KLENOW and RODRIGUEZ-CLARE [2005] tested several classes of models which feature externalities in the
accumulation of knowledge possessed by ﬁrms, by workers or by researchers, and other models in which externalities
are absent. Through these tests, they were able to conﬁrm Lucas’ intuition that models without externalities cannot
match basic macroeconomic stylized facts.
2. SHEA [2005] and PALMBERG and NIKULAINEN [2006] also hypothesize that nanotechnology may be a GPT because
it is likely a disruptive and radical technology but follows a different methodology to verify the conjecture.
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that patent generality scores associated with nanotechnology are comparable with those of
information technology (IT), thereby providing some preliminary evidence that nanotechnology
is a GPT. That evidence was limited, however, in terms of scope, coverage, and timing. With
this article we complement that study by employing different and updated data, thus providing
additional support to our earlier ﬁndings, as well as adding additional analyses and evidence.
Our article also offers a contribution in terms of using nanotechnology data. In previous
work that examined nanotechnology patenting in the United States, it has been common to rely
exclusively on one deﬁnition – whether it be the classiﬁcation-based deﬁnition of the USPTO
or a simple keyword search of patent titles or abstracts, such as a Boolean search of any term
including the stem “nano-.” In our study, we rely upon three different deﬁnitions of US-granted
“nanotechnology patents:” The technology classiﬁcation applied by the USPTO (3-digit), a
comprehensive keyword deﬁnition created at the Georgia Institute of Technology (see PORTER
et al. [2008]), and, for the ﬁrst time to our knowledge, matches from the US data to the European
Patent Ofﬁce’s experimental patent classiﬁcation for nanotechnology, Y01N.
Our methodology is inspired by authors who have used industry data instead of patents, and
in so doing were able to examine pervasiveness and innovation spawning separately. We build on
a test employed by JOVANOVIC and ROUSSEAU [2005] for the pervasiveness of electricity and
of IT using diffusion curves across industry sectors (using the share of horse power electriﬁed,
and the IT shares of capital stock, respectively). They inferred that follow-on innovations were
spawned by the GPT, using as evidence the frequency of initial public offerings (IPOs) by
ﬁrms that embraced these new technologies. We similarly evaluate pervasiveness by building
dissemination curves for the three selected technologies, but instead of using stock market data
– which is not commonly available for nanotechnology ﬁrms – we rely upon patent citation
patterns. We exploit the historical aspect of the patent data and proxy for knowledge ﬂows
running from the nanotechnology ﬁeld to other innovation ﬁelds. For evaluation, we compare
the results for nanotechnology patents with those we obtain by examining a technology often
considered to be a GPT (i.e., IT) and a technology that had speciﬁc application primarily to one
industry (i.e., the combustion engine in the automobile industry). The main aspect that we want
to uncover is whether these external knowledge ﬂows are limited to a handful of patent classes,
or whether the effect of these ﬂows can be seen more generally across many classes.
In a further contribution, we draw a historical parallel between the advancement of steel
technologies and nanotechnology, and to suggest that both share commonalities with other
GPTs. This view is consistent with the historical record, since GPTs are often associated with
technological eras, such as the “long waves” described by KONDRATIEV [1935]. While the
last quarter of the 20th century has been labeled the “Age of Information Technology”3 and the
ﬁrst quarter of the 20th century is often called the “Age of Electricity,”4 historians also refer to
the last third of the 19th century as the “Age of Steel” (see LANDES [1969], pp. 249-259) or
combine eras together as the “Age of Electricity and Steel” (see FREEMAN and SOETE [1997],
pp. 55-84). Steel is often referenced along with these other GPTs as deﬁning an economic era,
3. The US Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (CCRP) has published several volumes edited
by David S. Alberts referred to as an anthology on the information age. For the ﬁrst in the series, see ALBERTS and
PAPP [1997].
4. But see MOSER and NICHOLAS [2004] for a contrarian view on the revolutionary aspects of electricity.
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and – like nanotechnology – steel was a new material which we contend fulﬁlls the three GPT
deﬁnitional criteria.
Our article is subject to the usual limitations of studies that attempt to infer the features of
innovation through patents. First, not all innovative activity is reﬂected in the patent system.
Secondly, a given patent class (assigned by patent examiners) does not necessarily have a clear
correspondence with a technological ﬁeld. While there is little we can do to correct for the ﬁrst
point, we do address the second issue by using alternative classiﬁcation systems for robustness
(we use both USPTO and IPC patent classes), and by using alternative methods to deﬁne IT,
computer / software, and nanotechnology patents.
The balance of this article is organized as follows. Section two discusses links between
our article and the GPT literature, making the case that the latter has neglected the historical
role of “new materials” in propelling dynamism in economies. Section three moves to an
analysis of the patent data, demonstrating that patenting activity is highly concentrated in
a few technology classes. Section four discusses the concept of “innovation spawning” and
examines its presence by using knowledge-ﬂow dissemination curves. In section ﬁve we provide
a comment on the question of technology “convergence.” Section six builds and explains our
patent citation “generality” indexes, ﬁnding strong and persistent evidence of “pervasiveness”
in nanotechnology patents. We provide a discussion of our ﬁndings in section seven. Section
eight concludes.
II. General Purpose Technologies
The starting point of the GPT literature is the seminal article of BRESNAHAN and TRAJTEN-
BERG [1992], who criticize the smooth view of the innovation process underlying the theoretical
models by ROMER [1986; 1990] and AGHION and HOWITT [1992].5 According to BRESNA-
HAN and TRAJTENBERG [1992], much of modern economic growth unfolds in a particular way.
First there is a major innovation, which is relatively rough and subject to gradual improvement.
This basic technology spurs new secondary innovations in a like-tree structure. As the number
of downstream technology applications increase, there are greater incentives to improve the
basic technology, making it more and more efﬁcient. At the same time that the basic technology
is being perfected, a wider breadth sectors ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to adopt it.
Contrary to standard economic growth theory, the GPT literature considers the technology
dissemination process. The basic idea of the model proposed by HELPMAN and TRAJTENBERG
[1998] is that GPTs do not come “ready to use off the shelf” – they must be complemented by
the development of a new family of equipment (and processes) which requires the diverting of
resources from production into development. A new GPT will be adopted only after the number
of new secondary technologies hits a critical mass. During this “sowing” phase, measured output
declines as the economy is preparing itself to replace existing equipment (associated with a
pre-existing GPT) with new equipment (complementary to the new GPT), a phenomenon that
5. BRESNAHAN and TRAJTENBERG [1992] is not the ﬁrst formal work to characterize growth as a mix of major
innovations, each of which was followed by a family of incremental innovations. Pioneering work by JOVANOVIC and
ROB [1990] generates waves in production by assuming that a groundbreaking technological change is followed by
secondary innovation.
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may generate a productivity slowdown.6 This mechanism has not been corroborated empirically,
at least at low frequency, because R&D spending in the US after WWII has expanded at a
relatively constant pace, both as a percentage of GDP and as a fraction of the labor force,
whereas the economy has shown periods of expansion and depression. In the alternative, others
suggest that the adoption of a GPT causes a productivity slowdown because there are hidden
adoption costs: Firms must be reorganized and workers need to acquire new skills speciﬁc to
the new GPT (see DAVID [1990]).
Several technologies have been considered as candidates for being GPTs (see LIPSEY,
CARLAW, and BEKAR [2006] for a review). Interestingly, most authors have been attracted
by the revolutionary role played by new forms or sources of energy (e.g., steam, electricity,
engines), new forms of transportation (e.g., ships, railroads), or some combination of them (e.g.,
steam-powered rail engines). There is a notable exception, however, in that new materials have
not been included. This omission is surprising given that, for example, economic historians
point to the central role played by advances in chemicals and the chemical industry in the rise
of German, Swiss, Danish, Italian, and Polish industrial might in the 19th and 20th centuries.7
Even today, chemicals account for a large fraction of the most-cited patents, many of which are
generally adopted across technology space (see HALL and TRAJTENBERG [2004], Table 8, and
MOSER and NICHOLAS [2004], Table 1).
II.1. Materials as GPTs: A Case for Steel
Materials, we argue, may serve as a GPT. In his classic work, LANDES [1969] divides the
industrialization process of Western Europe into “technological eras,” each of which is driven
by a technological prime-mover. James Watt’s steam engine was the prime-mover of the ﬁrst
phase of the Industrial Revolution, and its diffusion throughout the economy revolutionized the
organization of existing sectors, such as metallurgy, textiles, and transportation.8 But Landes
attributes emulation in continental Europe for the creation and use of new materials: That is,
the rise of the new chemical industry. Indeed, he puts at the center stage of modern German
industrial development that nation’s advances in metallurgy, along with the adoption of new
sources of power (steam, combustion engine), and the distribution of energy (electricity).
Metallurgy is properly a branch of applied chemistry, but given that modern economies are
built on steel, historians have tended to consider it as separate from other chemical manufacture.
Landes names the last third of the 19th century the “Age of Steel.”
We suggest that steel, a material, easily satisﬁes the three main criteria of a GPT, to
wit: pervasiveness, the spawning of downstream innovations, and technological dynamism.9
6. For analysis of this hypothesized slowdown, see BASU and FERNALD [2008].
7. Authors in HOMBURG, TRAVIS, and SCHRÖTER [1998] argue that the period from 1850 to 1914 was extremely
important in the development of the chemical industry. Chemistry combined technology and science to become one of
the most important industries in the Second Industrial Revolution. A similar argument is developed in LANDES [1969].
Despite this, growth economists seem to have been less interested in chemistry than some other sciences.
8. Of course, hundreds of other innovations occurred in England during this period, and only some are directly associated
with the steam engine, as witnessed by the broad set of technologies displayed at London’s Crystal Palace Exposition in
1851 and other technology fairs organized later in other European cities. See generally MOSER [2005].
9. Previous characterizations of GPTs often included a ’generic function’ such as the steam engine’s “rotary motion.”
But this generic function imposes an unnecessarily restrictive deﬁnition on a major breakthrough technology, and we do
not consider it further.
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In terms of pervasiveness, modern industry is built on a framework of steel. Furthermore,
steel is used widely in household appliances and ubiquitously in transportation infrastructure.
A parsimonious way of looking at the dissemination of this material in its technological
infancy, and the complementary construction of new machines, would be to examine total steel
production by the top producer countries of Britain, France, Germany and Belgium. In 1861,
before the Bessemer process of mass steel production was adopted, aggregate steel production in
these four nations was approximately 125,000 tons per year. In 1913 after the Bessemer process
had taken hold, total production amounted to 32,000,000 tons, a gain of 83 fold, or a growth of
approximately 10 per cent per year (see LANDES [1969], p. 259). This evidence supports the
historical record – steel was being widely applied to uses throughout these economies.
Steel has also spawned complementary innovations. Steel’s strength in proportion to weight
and volume makes possible the creation of lighter, smaller and yet more precise and rigid–hence
faster–machines and engines. This strength also makes it an excellent construction material,
especially in shipbuilding, where the weight of the vessel and the resulting space left for
cargo allow transportation efﬁciencies. Hence steel allowed the creation of new, more efﬁcient
machines and engines, induced architects and engineers to create lighter designs for industrial
plants, buildings and houses, and made possible the creation of a large array of equipment used
by both industry and household.
If steel is to ﬁt the deﬁnition of a GPT it should also exhibit “technological dynamism,”
a characteristic for which we can test using two methods. We can measure improvements in
the quality of the product, or we may calculate a reduction in the product’s production cost
(the latter reﬂecting corresponding process innovations, as in GORT and KLEPPER [1982]. To
be parsimonious, we report data on the prices of steel from LANDES [1969] assuming these
reﬂect production cost.10 While in 1815 the price of steel was £ 700 per ton in England, by the
middle of the 19th century it had fallen to £ 55 in Sweden, a substantial reduction even when
ignoring inﬂation. While new market entry and economies of scale in production were important
determinants of price reduction, new organizational and process innovations also played a
signiﬁcant role. By 1850, innovations like the “puddling” production process had driven prices
down to about £ 22 per ton. When the Bessemer and Siemens-Martin process innovations were
introduced in the late 1850s, steel was selling at market for £ 7 per ton. Hence, in 1860 the
price of steel suggests the commodity was approximately two orders of magnitude less costly
to produce than it had been in 1815, amounting to a constant decline of about 10 percent per
year. In the following 35 years, the price fell an additional 90 per cent, corresponding to an
annual decline of about 2.5 percent. Such price reductions are not unlike those shown across 23
product industries by GORT and KLEPPER [1982], declines that they attribute during industry
life-cycles primarily to innovation, not ﬁrm entry or economies of scale.11
10. LANDES [1969], pp. 253-55, provides what appear to be reliable data on the price of cast steel.
11. How does this decline in the price of steel compare with other GPT candidates such as IT, electricity, and motors?
According to our calculation based on ﬁgure 11 in JOVANOVIC and ROUSSEAU [2005], over the span of a century the
price of motors and vehicles declined at a similar rate (2.3 per cent per year). The rate of price decline in IT equipment
since the earlier 1960s is ten times larger, but exhibits a quite exceptional phenomenon from a historical perspective.
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II.2. Comparison: Nanotechnology and Steel Technology
The parallel between steel and nano-materials must be drawn at a technology level, since hard
data on prices, investments and the like are not yet readily available for nanotechnology. There
are qualitative indications that the three main GPT attributes (pervasiveness, technological
dynamism, and fostering innovation in other sectors) may be present in nanotechnology. As with
steel, there is not a generic function that can be associated with nanotechnology. Accordingly,
one characterization of GPT provided in BRESNAHAN and TRAJTENBERG [1995], that it has a
“generic function,” is restrictive and difﬁcult to demonstrate in our candidates.12 Nevertheless,
we see in nanotechnology a class of materials that has the potential to radically change the
manufacturing process, in a manner possibly as far reaching as steel did in the second phase of
the industrial revolution.
Steel’s compactness and strength were the two deﬁning characteristics of its utility for
follow-on and complementary equipment. Similarly, nanotechnology is deﬁned by its scale,
ranging from one to 100 nanometers (nm).13 A switch to nano scales is ﬁnding application in
many areas of production.14
Signs of nanotechnology’s pervasiveness abound. Nano-materials are commonly used to
replace existing larger-scale ones and to solve new technical problems. An example of this
“replacement” effect can be found in IT. HARRIOTT [2001] reports that concerns in many
industries about the possibility of Moore’s Law reaching its physical limit have begun to be
addressed by nanotechnology’s potential to sustain circuit density increases through small
scale lithography alternatives such as nano-imprint lithography or eventually self-assembly
(see also ARNOLD [1995]).15 Another example can be found in medical applications: Matter
at the nano-scale exhibits novel properties which cannot be projected from either larger or
smaller scales (see KOSTOFF et al. [2006] and TANNENBAUM [2005]). For instance, it has been
discovered that the release of nano-scale agents can be triggered by differences in the acidity or
alkalinity of the surrounding medium, a mechanism unique to materials of this scale.
In our analysis of the patent data below, we present a quantitative assessment of nanotech-
nology as a force that induces further innovation. But our quantitative evidence is supported
by other qualitative data, including suggestions concerning the body of innovation spurred
by nanotechnology. LUX RESEARCH [2006], for instance, proposes a speciﬁc value chain
comprised of an initial set of nano-materials (such as carbon nano-tubes) which may be used
as inputs into intermediate products. These intermediates can assimilate such nano-materials
into coatings to enhance properties of ﬁnishes, and ultimately into ﬁnal products which can
integrate these coatings into a diverse set of product offerings. These ﬁnal products may include
12. This principle is intended as a general one around which new complementary technologies are developed. Examples
of technologies with a generic function are continuous rotary motion for the steam engine and transistorized binary
logic for integrated circuits (see LIPSEY, BEKAR, and CARLAW [1998]).
13. One nanometer equals one billionth of a meter.
14. Although we emphasize the similarity between steel and nanotechnology, there are important differences as well. A
reviewer comments that steel is produced by a speciﬁc sector but is used by many sectors: Manufacturing, construction
and engineering. In contrast, nanotechnology is both produced and used in many sectors. We discuss in this paper how
a technology may be considered a GPT if it satisﬁes a set of parameters calculated on the application side rather than on
the production side.
15. Moore’s Law is not a physical law per se, but instead was a prediction made by Intel’s Gordon Moore in the 1970s
that CPU transistor counts, and thus computing power, would double every two years. MOORE [1975].
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automobiles, airplanes, electronics displays, nano-treated clothes, refrigerator surfaces with
microorganism growth inhibitors, self-cleaning windows that oxidize organic matter, and the
like. Lux suggests that this value chain is supported by a set of complementary tools including
scanning probe microscopes, nanofabrication tools, and computer modeling systems.16
Scope for improvement is likely associated with a combination of size reduction, lower
production costs, and greater complexity of nano-materials. Nano-applications in semiconductor
manufacturing technology aided in reducing processing from 90 nm to 65 nm 2005, and again to
45 nm in 2007 (see KANELLOS [2005; 2006]). An interesting case of reduction is documented
by LUX RESEARCH [2006] for AFM instruments, whose prices – adjusted for the number of
features – have declined due to the application of nanotechnology. Perhaps the most elaborate
prediction on the breath of nanotechnology’s technological improvement is to be found in
the works of ROCO [2004; 2005], where it is predicted that the ﬁeld will evolve a level of
complexity bringing beneﬁts equal to those of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) or biotechnology.
Such predictions aside, we contend that, to adequately examine the role played by “materials”
like nanotechnology as GPTs, it is useful to focus on the process of technology diffusion.
Previous analyses of the technology diffusion process have offered a number of new questions
(see ATACK, BATEMAN, and MARGO [2008]; BASU and FERNALD [2008]; CRAFTS [2004];
KIM [2005]; ROSENBERG and TRAJTENBERG [2004]). Accordingly, we will examine evidence
of knowledge spillovers running across invention sectors as a part of our analysis.
III. Patent-Based Analyses of Nanotechnology
To complete our empirical analyses, we use US patent data from 1975 to 2006. We do not
believe that limiting our data to US patented inventions presents a barrier to generalizing our
results. First, the United States remains one of the world’s largest markets, and ﬁrms with a
global marketing strategy will generally patent in Europe, Japan, and the US. Second, although
a substantial share of global innovative activity in emerging technology ﬁelds takes place
outside the US, it is nevertheless unlikely that any limitation of the geographical composition of
innovation activity signiﬁcantly affects our statistical analysis. This latter point is buttressed by
our use of two patent technology classiﬁcations in our analyses, that administered by the USPTO
and an alternative administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
In our analysis, we employ patent citations. These citations are patent references that
newly-granted patent documents include as in indication of “prior art” for the focal invention.
If a focal patent B cites back to some earlier-issued patent A, we know that an individual
involved in the invention, the prosecution, or the examination of the B patent believed that
the earlier-issued patent A described a critical piece of knowledge upon which the invention
speciﬁed in B built. Although citations have commonly been used as a source of information
16. This view is not without its critics. MEYER [2007] suggests that nano-materials support the value chain rather than
constituting the initial element because of the linking function these materials play. Based on a cluster analysis of more
than 5,400 patent classiﬁcations, he offers another candidate nano-industry structure: Measurement-focused, materials
in composites and coatings, pharmaceuticals/chemicals, and electronics/devices, with instrumentation serving as a
connecting and enabling technology.
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for measuring knowledge spillovers, there are three caveats that researchers ought to bear in
mind. First, the person adding patent A to the B document may be the inventor, the inventor’s
patent agent or lawyer, or it may be the patent examiner at the USPTO (see ALCACER and
GITTELMAN [2006]). Accordingly, it is difﬁcult to draw a direct causal link between the piece
of knowledge embodied in document B and the inventor of the invention described in patent A.
That said, in the aggregate these citation patterns are useful for tracking the development of a
technology over time. Second, non-patented innovations may draw from technical knowledge
described in patent documents. Third, inventors may draw important information from reading
the relevant scientiﬁc literature. These last two observations imply an underestimation of the
spillover effects, whereas the ﬁrst one would bias the result in the opposite direction.17
Given a sufﬁciently long time span, patents may also be meaningfully categorized according
to the citations that they receive after grant, often called their “forward citations.” In the above
example, patent B would be a forward citation to patent A. These forward citations, however,
tend to develop slowly, given that the mean lag between patent application and patent grant in
the US is approximately 3 years.18 The count of citations received by a given patent provides a
proxy for the “importance” or “technological impact” of a patent. Forward citations have also
been shown to correlate strongly with the market value of the patent (see HARHOFF, SHERER,
and VOPEL [2003]) and with the market value of ﬁrms holding the patents (see HALL, JAFFE,
and TRAJTENBERG [2005]).
III.1. Growth Trends in Patent Grants
FIGURE 1 displays a time series for overall US patenting, as well as patenting in the Combustion
Engine (CE), Nanotechnology and Software arts. We are interested in CE as a comparison,
primarily because it is a mature technology and was closely tied to one particular industry
– automobiles – during the 20th century.19 Software is an important component of IT, a class of
technologies which have been hypothesized to be a GPT. While IT has been diffusing since at
least the 1950s, the growth spurt of software-related technologies – and the patenting thereof –
tend to be of more recent vintage (see GRAHAM and MOWERY [2003]). Therefore, at a given
point in time, these three technologies would likely be at different phases in their life-cycles.
Given their speciﬁc trajectories, we expect that the knowledge spillovers to other technologies
generated by CE should be constant (or even falling) over our study period (1975 to 2006),
while those attributable to IT should be increasing although at a lower rate than those associated
with nanotechnology.
The “software” technology time series presented in FIGURE 1 is based on US patents
assigned to classes 707, 709 and 711. These classes roughly correspond to international patent
17. ADAMS and CLEMMONS [2006] sought to control some of these problems by complementing citations with ﬁrms’
R&D expenditure.
18. The USPTO reports ﬁgures between 32.4 and 35.3 months of “average total pendency” for the years 2008-2012.
US PATENT, AND TRADEMARK OFFICE [2012], p. 14.
19. In 1859 Etienne Lenoir invented a motor that combined a mixture of gas and air. While his prototype was not
commercially viable, it provided a general model for other innovators. By 1862 Beau de Rochas had invented the
four-stroke cycle, but commercial success would not occur until 1876 when N.A. Otto combined de Rochas’s design
with pre-compression of the charge to produce the ﬁrst practical gasoline engine. Otto’s ’silent’ engine offered clear
advantages over the market-dominant steam engine since it was cleaner and more efﬁcient, and the supply of fuel to the
engine was more simple to automate. LANDES [1969], pp. 279-80.
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FIGURE 1. – Growth in Issued Patents, by Technology, 1975-2006
class G06, the primary “software” class identiﬁed in GRAHAM and MOWERY [2004]. Consistent
with our assumptions, we see growth over time in the number of software inventions being
patented in the United States. Moreover, this growth is occurring at a greater rate relative to both
“all patenting” and combustion-engine patenting (FIGURE 1). Combustion engine patents are
included in US class 123 and 60, which roughly correspond to F02 in the WIPO classiﬁcation
(see GRAHAM [2006]).
We utilize three different but overlapping classiﬁcations of nanotechnology patents in
our analyses. The relationship among these three deﬁnitions is summarized in FIGURE 2.
Corresponding to the data plotted as “nanotechnology” patents in FIGURE 1, we use the
experimental classiﬁcation applied at the USPTO, patent class 977. From 1975-2005, a total
of 4,216 patents have been assigned by the USPTO to this experimental class.20 The trend for
these nanotechnology patents shows growth in inventors seeking patents from 1975-2005, with
a growth rate at least as high as that shown in software for most of the 1990s, although the
growth rate in nanotechnology appears to have slowed during the period 2002-2005. While we
use the USPTO nanotechnology deﬁnition exclusively for this trend analysis, elsewhere in our
article we employ comparisons between the USPTO “nanotechnology” classiﬁcation (class 977)
and a key-word deﬁnition reported in PORTER et al. [2008] (the use of which produces 9,707
patent matches between 1975-2005) and another experimental patent technology classiﬁcation
created by the European Patent Ofﬁce, class Y01N (to which we were able to match 10,148
US-issued patents during 1975-2005).
FIGURE 1 demonstrates that the USPTO issued about 72,000 patents in 1975 and approxi-
mately 175,000 in 2006, implying an annual growth rate of 2.9%.21 As one would expect, a
smaller growth rate is shown in the patenting of combustion-engine inventions over the same
time period: 2.6%. Conversely, the two emerging technologies of software and nanotechnology
20. The USPTO assigns each “nanotechnology” patent to at least one permanent non-experimental class, and also
assigns each patent in parallel to the experimental class 977.
21. Coincidentally, this ﬁgure is close to the annual growth rate of per capita income, which for the same period is about
one percentage point lower.
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FIGURE 2. – Relationships Among Three Sets of Nanotechnology Patents
Note: Each circle represents the set of a different Nanotechnology Patent Dataset. The rightmost set (solid line) represents patents in the USD
family members of European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) patents classed in the experimental class Y01N by the EPO. The bottommost set (dotted line)
is based on patents issued in experimental class 977 of the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO), whereas the leftmost set (dashed line) is
based on patents selected by key words elaborated in Porter, et al. [2008] (PYSS). Numbers in the interior underlined represent the intersections
of various sets. Therefore PYSS ∩ EPO ∩ USPTO = 576 patents, while PYSS ∪ EPO= (10,148+ 9,707− 576− 600) = 18,679 patents. The
patents represented in this ﬁgure were issued over the period 1976-2005.
display a relatively high growth: 15% and 17% respectively (due to the paucity of patenting
prior to the mid-1980s, we limited the calculation for nanotechnology to the period 1986-2006).
III.2. Technology Concentration
Measured by the international patent classiﬁcation (IPC), there are approximately 250 three-
digit WIPO technology categories of which about 90% have assigned at least 10 patents during
1976-2006. For computational convenience we restrict our attention to this group of patents,
which amounts to 2,626,821 US patents distributed across 226 3-digit IPC groupings. This
same stock of patents is distributed across 424 three-digit USPTO patent classes. Since we
are interesting in investigating the trail of “knowledge spillovers” across technological ﬁelds,
we conduct several analyses to gain insights into the distribution of patents across technology
categories.
The statistical literature has elaborated several measures to compute the concentration of
an attribute (see the excellent review by ATKINSON [1970]). Some of these measures have
become popular in recent political economy studies that investigate the relationship between the
concentration of income, land, or wealth and the process of development. To understand – in
Rosenberg’s words – the “direction” of technological change driven by emerging technologies,
we borrow from this literature and use the Lorenz curve, the Gini index, and a Quintiles
representation of patents across different patent classes (TABLE I, panels A and B). FIGURE 3
contains a Lorenz curve representing patent-class concentration during 1975-2002. A value of x
on the horizontal axis is the fraction of the WIPO technology classes ranked in increasing order
with respect to the number of patents. The vertical axis reports the percentage of the all patents
accounted for by the x fraction of WIPO categories. For instance, the point (0.9, 0.3) indicates
STUART GRAHAM AND MAURIZIO IACOPETTA
TABLE I. – Distribution of Patents and Concentration of Patent Classes
Panel A: Distribution of Patents by Quintiles (Q)
Period Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1975-2002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0233 0.1239 0.8521
1975-1982 0.0001 0.0005 0.0393 0.1590 0.8011
1983-1993 0.0002 0.0006 0.0246 0.1353 0.8393
1994-2002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0187 0.0992 0.8814
Panel B: Concentration of Technologies, by Patent Class
Period Gini Index Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
1975-2002 0.8087 0.6857 0.5040 0.2011
1975-1982 0.7740 0.6280 0.4546 0.1793
1983-1993 0.7993 0.6674 0.4859 0.1908
1994-2002 0.8318 0.7291 0.5428 0.2474
Source: Authors’ Elaboration
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FIGURE 3. – Lorenz Curve of Granted Patents, 1975-2002.
Note: During this period, 2.6 million US patents were issued, and were segmented into 226 different 3-digit interna-
tional patent classes.
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that 90 percent of the WIPO classes with the lowest patent frequency account for 30 percent
of all patents. Hence, as the curve diverges from the forty-ﬁve degree line, the patents in the
distribution are increasingly concentrated in an increasingly small number of classes.
As another concentration measure, we present a Gini index, reported in the second column
of TABLE I, Panel B. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the
straight 45-degree line, normalized in the zero-one interval. The Gini index approaches zero as
the Lorenz curve approaches the forty-ﬁve degree line, and goes to one when the Lorenz curve
approaches the horizontal axis. A visual inspection of the Lorenz curve for all patents in our
sample reveals a high degree of concentration among a handful of patent classes. This feature
is conﬁrmed by a Quintile representation of the data in TABLE I, Panel A, which shows that
the top quintile accounts for 85 percent of the overall patents in our sample. The ﬁrst row of
TABLE I, Panel A also reports the concentration at the top 10th, 5th, and 1st percentile, which
account for 68, 50, and 20 percent, respectively.
In order to gain further insights into the dynamics of the concentration indices, we split
our observation period into three sub-periods: 1975-82, 1983-93, and 1994-2002.22 The Gini
index and percentile data are reported in the remaining rows of TABLE I, Panel B. All measures
suggest an increasing degree of concentration as we move forward in time. The Gini index rises
0.77 to 0.83 from the ﬁrst period to the second, while the top quintile increases from 0.8 to 0.88
and the top 1 percentile from 0.18 to 0.25 across the two periods.
In sum, our analyses of the patent data show a great deal of concentration among a handful
of “star” technological classes. Furthermore, this concentration has become more and more
pronounced during the period for which we have data (1975-2002). In SECTION VII below, we
clarify the extent to which these two observations affect the main analysis of our article.
IV. Testing for Innovation Spawning
One of the characteristics of a GPT as deﬁned in BRESNAHAN and TRAJTENBERG [1992] is that
the candidate technology should induce further innovation in other sectors. In JOVANOVIC and
ROUSSEAU [2005] this feature is evaluated by examining the dynamism of patenting activity,
and by observing entry and exit in the stock market, this latter indicator intended to proxy for
the replacement of an obsolete GPT with a new one. They found that patenting in each of the
IT and electricity eras were more intense than in the decades separating the two periods. Our
disaggregated data on citations allow us to assess the hypothesis that this pattern will hold at a
different level. The phenomenon that we want to measure is the extent to which nano-inventions
have been used as an input for inventions in other technological ﬁelds. While we examined some
anecdotes of nano-materials as inputs in Section 2 above, these isolated cases do not help us to
determine whether the “spawning” phenomenon is a general characteristic of nanotechnologies.
Using our comprehensive data, we build a “knowledge dissemination curve” with the
patent citation data. Our method employs patent citations, exploiting this information to infer
“knowledge ﬂows” from inventions assigned into one patent technology class to later-in-time
inventions embodied in patents assigned to a different technology class. As an example, imagine
22. We limited data collection to end in 2002 in order to allow us to collect forward citations, which are latent and
develop only after the patents grant.
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that we are interested in measuring the spillover from nano-inventions to a given technological
class N. For the sake of simplicity assume in period t that 100 patents are granted, and that a
fraction r of these patents cite backward to at least one nanotechnology patent. The variable r is
our proxy for the R&D externalities generated by nanotechnology, calculated by employing
cross-technology class citations on issued patents.
We compute this index for each of the USPTO’s 424 different patent classes during three
different eras for three distinct technologies (as deﬁned by 3-digit patent classiﬁcations):
Combustion engines (CE), information technology (IT), and nanotechnology. We selected
IT and nanotechnologies because the former is a GPT candidate technology, and we are at-
tempting to discover whether the latter shares characteristics with the former. For comparison
purposes, we also chose CE technology because it is closely identiﬁed with a single industry
(automotive), and has not been cited as a GPT. Both CE and IT have a long technology pedigree,
and thus we were able to choose three periods for analysis that permitted us a sufﬁcient “forward
citation window” in which to have a more complete analysis, settling on the cohorts of 1986-89,
1992-95, and 1998-2001 (spanning 16 years). Due to the late emergence of sufﬁcient numbers
of nanotechnology patents, we settled on the cohorts 1990-94, 1996-99, and 2002-05 for an
analysis of our nanotechnology patents (also spanning 16 years).
To conduct our analysis, we obtained a time series of the index r consisting of three
points, each of which is meant to represent the ﬂow of knowledge during a period for a
particular candidate technology. Since it would be cumbersome to represent over 400 time-
series on a plot, we chose to depict r by percentile for the top 5% of the distribution, and
by deciles for the remaining part of the overall distribution. In other words, in every period
the 424 USPTO classes are ranked in increasing order relative to the index r, and only the
values of r associated with the PTO class located at the ﬁrst, second, et seq. deciles or at
the 95th, 96th et seq. percentiles are plotted. The outcome of this procedure is what we call a
“knowledge dissemination curve” (henceforth KDC) for a given technology. In Figures 4 and 5,
the KDC represents nanotechnology, whereas Figures 6 and 7 are associated with information
technologies, and Figures 8 and 9 are associated with combustion engines.
FIGURES 8 and 9 show that the 98th and 99th percentiles of the combustion engine
KDCs correspond to approximately 0.2 and 0.25 and show a mild positive time trend. The
corresponding KDCs for nanotechnology in Figures 4 and 5 begin below 0.02 at the leftmost
(earliest) point and rise to 0.07 and 0.09 in the most recent period. It does not surprise us that
citations are greater in a mature technology than in an emerging one.
The interesting novelty is how rapidly the gap closes between these two sets of KDCs.
Should these time trends remain stable, the ﬁgures suggest that the gap at the 98th and 99th
percentile would be eliminated in a bit more than one decade. A quick inspection of the lower
percentiles reveals the difference between the two families of KDCs is signiﬁcantly smaller,
suggesting that catching-up may require an even shorter period of time.
The comparison between IT (Figures 6 and 7) and nanotechnology KDCs at the 98th and
99th percentile shows a much wider gap. The information technology KDCs reach a level of
about 0.8 and 0.5, respectively. Given these trends, more than half a century would be required
for the nanotechnology KDCs to reach the same level shown in IT. But it is not a given that the
slope of nanotechnology KDCs will remain constant: Indeed, trends may increase sharply and
follow the typical S-shape of many dissemination curves.
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FIGURE 4. – Dissemination of Nanotechnology Knowledge by Percentile
(In Top 5% of the Distibution)
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: The top dashed line of Figure 4 displays a ratio: the number of patents in a focal class that cite to at least
one nanotechnology-classed patent divided by the total number of patents classiﬁed in the focal class, here
ranked at the 99th percentile for the number of nano-patent citations. The second line from the top shows the
same numerical information but for the technology patent class that occupies the 98th percentile, and so forth.
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FIGURE 5. – Dissemination of Nanotechnology Knowledge by Deciles
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: Similarly to Figure 4, the lines in Figure 5 display a ratio: the number of patents in a focal class that
cite to at least one nanotechnology-classed patent divided by the total number of patents classiﬁed in the focal
class. The top line is the 9th (highest) decile, while the second line from the top reﬂects technology patent
class that occupies the 8th decile, and so forth.
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FIGURE 6. – Dissemination of IT-Knowledge by Percentile
(In Top 5% of the Distibution)
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: Figure 6 is constructed identically to Figure 4, except that patent citations here refer to information
technology classes instead of nanotechnology classiﬁcation.
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FIGURE 7. – Dissemination of IT-Knowledge by Deciles
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: Figure 7 is constructed identically to Figure 5, except that patent citations here refer to information
technology classes instead of nanotechnology classiﬁcation.
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FIGURE 8. – Dissemination of Combustion-Engine Knowledge by Percentile
(In Top 5% of the Distibution)
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: Figure 8 is constructed identically to Figure 4, except that patent citations here refer to combustion
engine technology classes instead of nanotechnology classiﬁcation.
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FIGURE 9. – Dissemination of Combustion-Engine Knowledge by Deciles
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on US Patent data.
Note: Figure 9 is constructed identically to Figure 5, except that patent citations here refer to combustion
engine technology classes instead of nanotechnology classiﬁcation.
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Perhaps the most surprising result of these KDCs is that the 90th percentiles of IT and
nanotechnology KDCs reach the same level in the ﬁnal years of our examination period. In fact,
IT “knowledge spillovers” appear to be more concentrated in a handful of patent classes than
those characterizing either combustion engines or nanotechnologies. This observation may be
consistent with another type of dissemination curve employed in JOVANOVIC and ROUSSEAU
[2005], who used as a variable the percentage of IT capital investment across industries. They
ﬁnd that the dissemination curves tend to ﬂatten very quickly in all but the top percentiles.
Conversely, they ﬁnd greater regularity in the dissemination of electricity. Our data suggest that
similar patterns may hold for knowledge diffusion.
In brief, our dissemination curves suggest that the knowledge embodied in nanotechnology
is spreading more evenly across other patent classes compared to information technologies and
combustion engines. We do ﬁnd, however, that the intensity of spillovers from nanotechnology
is not as high as in the other two technologies we examined. Further analysis is required to
understand the extent to which our results depend on the fact that nanotechnology is in an early
phase of its technology life-cycle, or whether this feature that will persist.
V. Testing for Knowledge Convergence
One interesting feature of our KDCs is that they generally have a positive trend. We observe this
positive trend for CE patents (which represent a mature technology that was primarily adopted
in one – admittedly large – industry), for information technology (a well-established GPT
technology), and for nanotechnology (an emerging GPT candidate). This ﬁnding is inconsistent
with our initial hypothesis that a mature technology should show a ﬂat or perhaps declining
pattern of “knowledge spillovers.”
While it is difﬁcult to generalize from one mature technology, the ﬁnding raises a question:
Is there a common force that drives dissemination curves in a positive direction? While it is
tempting to interpret these patterns as evidence of an increasing level of “knowledge spillovers”
across technological ﬁelds over time (see GRODAL and THOMA [2009]), we have too little
evidence to argue that point in this article. We do, however, stress that the debate on cross-
pollination of ideas is relevant for the patent literature that bases its GPT tests on generality
indexes, for these may be inﬂated by knowledge convergence.
Our data do, however, allow us to compute the opposite of cross-pollination indicators. For a
given number of WIPO patent classes, we calculate the ratio between the number of same-class
citations and the overall citations in that focal WIPO patent class (for a list of these classes,
see TABLE II). As that ratio increases, the ﬂow of knowledge (as indicated by patent citations)
from other technological areas decreases. While the level of the ratio is difﬁcult to interpret, its
variation over time gives a clear indication of whether a given patent class is building more or
less from other patent classes. A reduction in the ratio for the majority of patent classes would
suggest a “convergence” across different areas of research and development. FIGURE 10 plots
the ratio just described for two periods: 1985-87 (horizontal axis) and 1992-94 (vertical axis).
The chart is comparative across time periods: If a patent class lies on the 45 degree line, that
position indicates there is no change in the relative “importance” of knowledge (as measured
by citations) that ﬂows from other ﬁelds. If a class lies below the 45 degree line, such position
indicates that the focal technology class is drawing relatively more from other ﬁelds.
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TABLE II. – Relevant International Patent Classiﬁcations (WIPO)
A01 Agriculture; forestry; animal husbandry; hunting; trapping; ﬁshing
A47 Furniture; domestic articles or appliances; coffee mills; spice mills, suction cleaners in general
A61 Medical or veterinary science; hygiene
A63 Life-saving; ﬁre-ﬁghting
B01 Physical or chemical processes or apparatus in general
B05 Spraying or atomising in general; applying liquids or other ﬂuent materials to surfaces, in general
B23 Machine tools; metal-working not otherwise provided for
B29 Working of plastics; working of substances in a plastic state in general
B32 Layered products
B41 Printing; lining machines; typewriters; stamps
B60 Vehicles in general
B65 Conveying; packing; storing; handling thin or ﬁlamentary material
C07 Organic chemistry
C08 Organic macromolecular compounds; their preparation or chemical working-up; compositions based thereon
C12 Biochemistry; beer; spirits; wine; vinegar; microbiology; enzymology; mutation or genetic engineering
E04 Building
F01 Machines or engines in general; engine plants in general; steam engines
F02 Combustion engines; hot-gas or combustion-product engine plants
F16 Engineering elements or units; general measures for producing and maintaining effective functioning of machines or installations;
thermal insulation in general
G01 Measuring; testing
G02 Optics
G03 Photography; cinematography; analogous techniques using waves other than optical waves; electrography; holography
G06 computing; calculating; counting
G09 Educating; cryptography; display; advertising; seals
G11 Information storage
H01 Basic electric elements
H02 Generation, conversion, or distribution of electric power
H03 Basic electronic circuitry
H04 Electric communication technique
H05 Electric techniques not otherwise provided for
Source: http://www.wipo.int/classiﬁcations/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en
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FIGURE 10. – Patterns of Self-Citations,
Comparing US Patents Issued in 1985-1987 and 1992-1994.
Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on USPTO dataset, comparing US patents classiﬁed in 3-digit interna-
tional patent classes (IPCs). For descriptions, see Table 2.
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An examination of FIGURE 10 does not suggest to us a clear pattern of convergence from
the second half of the 1980s to the early 1990s. In fact, the number of technology classes
falling below the 45 degree-line are only slightly more numerous that those falling above it.
Accordingly, we repeat this graphical analysis during a more recent period, depicting the results
in FIGURE 11. By plotting 1992-94 is on the horizontal axis and 1999-2001 on the vertical
one, we are able to demonstrate that in more recent years, the majority of patent classes plotted
below the 45-degree line. Such placement suggests that during the 1990s, a shift occurred
where the majority of technology classes were beneﬁting more from knowledge inputs derived
from different technological ﬁelds. Our analysis thus supports the hypothesis that “knowledge
spillovers” between technologies have accelerated during the 1990s, lending some credence to
the “convergence” hypothesis.
VI. Testing for Pervasiveness
In order to test for the “pervasiveness” of a GPT, HALL and TRAJTENBERG [2004] suggested
using a focal patent’s forward citations to generate a “generality score.” The generality score is
a species of the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman concentration Index (HHI) of the patent classes assigned
to the focal patent’s forward citations. This resulting measure of “pervasiveness” is deﬁned by
the formula
Generalityi = 1−
ni
∑
j
s2i j
where Si j = share of patent i’s forward citations in class j. The theory underlying the use of
this measure is that it captures information about the extent to which the focal patent is being
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applied in a wide range of technologies – the so called “pervasiveness” of a patented invention.
As a patent’s generality score increases, that patent is being cited by patents in a broader range
technology classes, and we therefore infer that the patent is being applied more broadly across
other technologies.
If we examine the generality scores across all patents in a particular technology (in nan-
otechnology for instance) and compare these against the scores for patents in other technologies,
we may infer something about the “pervasiveness” of the technology’s application throughout
the economy, at least as compared with other technologies. Obviously, any measure built in this
way will be very sensitive to right truncation. In the study of new and embryonic technologies in
which the patent record is slowly developing, the absence of a sufﬁcient “forward” time window
will pose great difﬁculties in calculating a useful generality index for individual patents, and
by extension entire patented technology areas. The trends depicted in FIGURE 1 demonstrate
that, in the emerging nanotechnologies, substantial numbers of patents began to issue from the
USPTO in the 1990s, thus giving us a sufﬁciently long forward window to develop credible
generality scores on the earliest patents issued in this new technology space.
TABLES III and IV report generality scores for several categories of patents, including all
patents issued in years 1976-2005 as well as two deﬁnitions of IT patents, and three deﬁnitions
of nanotechnology patents. The ﬁrst IT deﬁnition is derived from HALL [2005] and is a USPTO-
class deﬁnition of “computing and communication” IT patents.23 The second deﬁnition is more
speciﬁc to computers, and particularly to software, and is derived from GRAHAM and MOWERY
[2005].24 For simplicity, we conducted our analysis on patents in 5-year cohorts, 1976-2005.
TABLE III also discloses the number of patents issued within each sample in the cohort, and
also the number of “Cited” patents, the only patents for which the calculation of Generality
scores is possible.25
Several conclusions can be drawn from our examination of TABLES III and IV. First, our
results show a substantial truncation effect: The generality scores for patents issued after the year
1995 demonstrate deﬂation, likely due to the increasingly sparse numbers of citations received
as the “forward citation window” becomes increasingly short. More crucially, both the IT patent
samples show generality scores signiﬁcantly higher than those for aggregate US patenting, year
on year. Tests for signiﬁcance in the difference of means conﬁrm these differences in each
5-year cohort at the 99% conﬁdence level. It is interesting to note that while the generality
scores for the patents selected according to the “computing and communication” deﬁnition
applied in HALL [2005] (Sample 2) are higher than overall patenting (Sample 1), those selected
by the “computer / software” deﬁnition employed in GRAHAM and MOWERY [2005] (Sample
3) are signiﬁcantly higher than both. This observation is borne out by tests for signiﬁcance
reported in TABLE III showing between-sample differences signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence
level within each cohort. The fact that both these IT sampling methods selected patents with
23. By this deﬁnition, IT patents are those assigned to US classes 178, 333, 340, 342, 343, 358, 367, 370, 371, 375, 379,
385, 455, 704, 341, 364, 380, 382, 395, 700, 701, 702, 706, 708, 709, 712, 713, 714, 715, 717, 345, 347, 349, 710, 360,
365, 369, 707, 711, 703, 705, 725, and 902.
24. This software patent deﬁnition is also derived from the US classes, including classes 364, 395, 700, 701, 702, 706,
708, 709, 712, 713, 714, 715, and 717.
25. A “cited” patent is a patent that has been cited by some other patent. Uncited patents have had no citations (through
2006, the ﬁnal year in our data series), and thus for these observations it is impossible to calculate a generality score.
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signiﬁcantly higher “generality" scores year on year than in the overall population suggests
that these technologies are being adopted comparatively widely in the economy, and thus are
examples of “pervasive” technologies. It is accordingly strong evidence for the existence of a
GPT in these information technologies.
We extend this same analysis to nanotechnology patents, employing for the ﬁrst time we
are aware three different deﬁnitions of “nanotechnology” patents. TABLES III and IV produce
the results of our analysis and the generality scores during 1976-2005 for patents selected
by reference to the USPTO’s experimental class 977 (Sample 4), the keyword reported in
PORTER et al. [2008], (Sample 5), and the EPO’s experimental class Y01N (Sample 6). The
patents in Sample 6 are US-issued patents, connected through priority and family information
to equivalent EPO-issued patents assigned to class Y01N. We ﬁnd consistent results across all
three deﬁnitions.
Generality scores for 1976-2005 irrespective of the deﬁnitional scheme we employ demon-
strate that “nanotechnology” patents appear to share the characteristic of “pervasiveness” with
IT patents. First, under all three deﬁnitions, nanotechnology patents are more “general” than
patents as a whole (see TABLES III and IV between-sample tests of signiﬁcance). Moreover,
nanotechnology patents are by and large just as “general” as the patents selected to represent IT
technologies (see TABLES III and IV between-sample tests of signiﬁcance), and in fact appear
more general.
In TABLE IV, we present the results of an analysis of patents in which the union of all the
patents classiﬁed as “nanotechnology” under our three deﬁnitions (the union of samples 4, 5,
and 6) is compared with those classiﬁed as “information technology” (Sample 2). TABLE IV
reiterates the results of TABLE III, Sample 2 for comparative purposes. Tests for signiﬁcance
show that the combined nanotechnology sample (Sample 7) shows mean generality scores
within each 5-year cohort signiﬁcantly different from all patents, and also signiﬁcantly higher
than IT patents in all cohorts, with each difference being signiﬁcant above the 99% conﬁdence
interval.
The generality scores presented in TABLE III and TABLE IV present strong evidence of the
“pervasiveness” of nanotechnology patents, providing us with evidence that these technologies
exhibit one of the necessary characteristics of a GPT. Not only do we show signiﬁcantly higher
generality scores year on year regardless of which of three different, although overlapping (see
FIGURE 2), selection criteria we employ, but the generality scores we ﬁnd for nanotechnology
patents compare favorably with those of IT patents, a technology commonly considered a GPT.
The trend for nanotechnology patents is strong and consistent: Nanotechnology patents offer
evidence of the “pervasiveness” of this emerging technology.
VII. Discussion
One serious limitation in using citation data to infer the ﬂow of knowledge spillovers in a
particular class of innovations is that both patenting activities and innovation activities may be
only weakly correlated. If that is the case, one would tend to overestimate the pace of innovation
in a ﬁeld where for technical, legal, or economic reasons the tendency to patent an innovation is
unusually pronounced relative to other ﬁelds. For instance, it may be that the remarkable rise of
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electronic-related patenting since the 1970s may have outpaced the “actual’ underlying rate of
IT innovation. This issue has been raised in the literature, and some partial corrections have
been offered. ADAMS and CLEMMONS [2006] for instance uncover the ﬂow of basic research,
the patentability of which is notoriously poor, by using data on R&D spending and on scientiﬁc
publications.
We are left with a question after our analysis, however. To what extent are the conclusions
of the previous three sections affected by the possible differential degrees of patenting across
technological classes? We will argue that it is unlikely that the generality indices, or our
convergence results, are affected by such a bias, but that our knowledge dissemination curves
likely are affected. In addition we suggest that the position of the “actual” IT-knowledge
dissemination curves are likely to be below the ones we plotted (in FIG. 6 and 7), but in all
likelihood not below the ones plotted for combustion engines (FIG. 8 and 9).
The generality index measures the degree of technology-class dispersion in forward citations
of any given patent. By construction this measure does not depend on the absolute number of
citations received by a patent. Imagine that there are only two classes of patents, i and j, and we
are interested in computing the generality index of patents A and B, each of which are cited
100 and 200 times by later-issuing patents, respectively. Assume that patent A is cited 20 and
80 times in class i and j, and that patent B is cited 40 and 160 times (the order between i and j
does not matter). In either case the generality index would be identical (in this case, 0.42).
The suggestion that there has been a tendency for knowledge to converge in the second
part of the 1990s (and that no such a pattern was identiﬁable for the ﬁrst part of the decade)
was based on a “ﬁrst-difference’ argument, which is therefore immune from any concern over
the number of patents being issued and assigned into any particular patent class. Speciﬁcally,
convergence was inferred from observing that for most of the technological classes in the second
part of the 1990s, the percentage of intra-class citation was lower than in the ﬁrst part of the
decade. In terms of FIGURE 11, this observation suggests that most technology classes lay
below the 45 degree line. In truth, the wide variation of points along the 45 degree line–aligning
roughly from 0.3 to 0.8 on each axis–may be in fact due to the different degree of patentability
across technological ﬁelds (but that information was not used for the convergence result).
Such is not the case when we consider the KDC discussed in Section 4. We observed that the
information technology KDC (at the top percentile) was approximately an order of magnitude
higher than was the corresponding nanotechnology KDC. It remains for us to comment upon
what part of this gap, if any, can be explained by some unusually high degree of patentability
among IT innovations. Our answer consists of two parts. First we present data that support
the contention that IT is not a ﬁeld showing unusually intense patenting activity. Secondly, we
propose a way to make an educated guess about the patentability bias.
First, we point to evidence reported in the Carnegie-Mellon Survey (CMS) on appropriability
conditions in the US (see COHEN, NELSON, and WALSH [2000]). The CMS presents evidence
that patenting in IT has not outpaced industry averages during the mid-1990s. Reporting the
share of process- and product-innovations patented by ﬁrms, they show the rates in the electronic
component, semiconductor, and computing industries were each lower than the average of all
surveyed industries.
This observation is supported by data compiled in TABLE V, which represent the seven
WIPO patent classes (IPC) into which US patents have been most frequently assigned since
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TABLE V. – Most Frequent 3-Digit International Patent Classes Assigned to US Patents 1975-2002
Patent Class (3-digit) Description Frequency Position on Lorenz Curve
H01 Basic electric elements 199,902 1.00
A61 Medical or veterinary science; hygiene 185,990 0.92
G01 Measuring; testing 141,258 0.85
G06 computing; calculating; counting 116,985 0.80
H04 Electric communication technique 112,402 0.75
C07 Organic chemistry 109,662 0.71
B65 Conveying; packing; storing; handling thin material 94,912 0.67
Source: Authors’ Elaboration
the mid-1970s. These classes account for about 1/3 of all US patenting during this time period.
Although two of these classes (G01 and G06) are associated with IT inventions, neither of
these two are ranked at the very top. The number of patents assigned into these categories is of
similar magnitude to those assigned into chemistry, packaging, electricity, drugs and medical
equipment.
Although IT appears from this evidence to not be patented more than other technological
ﬁelds, the potential bias of ease-of-patentability is worth considering. GRAHAM and VISHNUB-
HAKAT [2013] ﬁnd that US patents sampled on a broad deﬁnition of “software” (ﬁltering on
IT which may have software included) do not fare better in the examination or appeal phases
at the USPTO than do the patents of other technologies. And while we may be concerned
that ease-of-patentability may affect all the most-frequented patent classes simultaneously, the
growth accounting literature provides valuable numerical information to clarify the issue. Sev-
eral authors have argued that the post-1995 productivity revival in the US and in other advanced
countries is in great part attributable not so much to the spread of computers but to productivity
gains attributable to the IT industry.26 There are no studies that point to advances in drugs or
chemicals or packaging as being the main driver of the remarkable surge seen in productivity.
Hence, if productivity is correlated with the “value” of new ideas, it is reasonable to conclude
that ideas in the IT area are not disproportionately patented relative to other technology classes.
Even if we accept that some bias towards excess patentability may exist, our data fortunately
give us a reliable upper-bound of what such a bias may be. An inspection of Figures 10 and
11 reveals that the lowest values of the intra-class citation ratio are associated with patent
class B32 (layered products) and B05 (spraying apparatus), each with a value of about 0.4.
Presumably neither of these two classes is related to information technologies—and neither are
listed in common deﬁnitional schemes for IT. In fact, the electronic classes with the highest
self-citation ratios are G03, G06, and G11, each scoring roughly between 0.65 and 8. These are
all “electronics” classes and, because of the high self-citation rate refer to like-classed patents
about twice as often as do patents assigned in the other non-electronics categories.
We believe accordingly that it is likely that part of the difference between these two groups
is accounted for by a genuine difference in the value of the underlying knowledge. Moreover,
we believe that individuals inventing new spraying apparatus (class B05) are more likely to
incorporate IT-related knowledge (whether ﬁxed in a patent or not) than is an IT-engineer likely
to use knowledge developed for spraying apparatus in a new device or piece of software. If by a
26. Robert Gordon is an advocate of this view. See for instance GORDON [2000; 2003].
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rule of thumb we say conservatively that only half of the difference is due to the patentability
bias, then it is fair to conclude that the position of the “real” IT Knowledge Dissemination Curve
is at most 25% lower than the ones we depict in Figures 6 and 7. We can therefore suggest
with conﬁdence, even after such a downward correction, a substantial gap between the IT and
nanotechnology KDCs would remain.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
In this article, we have examined the existing literature, and applied where appropriate its
teaching on GPTs to the emerging nanotechnology area. As stated, GPTs drive the expansion of
the technological frontier in modern economies, and eventually improve standards of living in
the long run. In this context, we asked ourselves whether evidence is now sufﬁciently strong to
argue that nanotechnology ought to be admitted to the club of GPTs. Any such determination
has important policy ramiﬁcations, especially since GPTs are believed to be the prime-movers
of long-run productivity waves.
In contrast to most known examples of GPTs found in the literature, such as steam engines,
electricity, and ICTs, the specialized literature we surveyed does not suggest an obvious aspect
of nanotechnology that can be labeled as a “generic function,” such as the rotary motion for
motors or the transistorized binary logic for microelectronics. However, by using steel as an
historical example, we argued that this feature should not be an exclusion factor, for it does not
appear particularly relevant and it is not readily testable with economic data.
We instead offer contributions in methods, data, and results to the current debate over GPTs
generally, and nanotechnology in particular. We test for two of the three main deﬁning features
of a GPT: “pervasiveness” and an increased likelihood to spawn downstream innovations, i.e.
“spawning.” Following the lead of HALL and TRAJTENBERG [2004] we employ data on US
patents and patent citations to build “generality” indices, ﬁnding evidence of a consistent and
strong “pervasiveness” in nanotechnology innovations.
Moreover, in order to give a quantitative content to the concept of innovation “spawn-
ing,” we exploited the alternative classiﬁcation possibilities offered by the USPTO, WIPO
and the EPO in nanotechnology patenting. We employed these data to quantify the intensity
and direction of “knowledge spillovers” ﬂowing from patented nanotechnology inventions to
patented inventions in other ﬁelds, and compared these with the spillovers we observed for
information technologies and combustion-engine inventions. By applying a methodological
advance – namely the knowledge dissemination curve – we obtained evidence that nanotechnol-
ogy knowledge spillovers appear to be more uniformly distributed across technological classes,
are less intensive, and have a much more pronounced time trend than those obtained for our
other focal technologies. In other words, nanotechnology appears to be following an S-shaped
technology development pattern, and to be positioned somewhere prior to the inﬂexion point.
We leave it to further research to verify whether this “uniformity” feature of nanotechnology
across technological ﬁeld will persist in the subsequent phases of diffusion. If it does, and the
amount of knowledge spillover continues to rise apace, we will likely before long see the results
in some hard economic data, such as in the productivity and investment numbers.
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